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Abstract 
 
Over the last decade European democracies have conducted numerous trials with a 
wide range of ICT enabled forms of novel political experimentation. These initiatives 
have been conducted across various levels of political authority, from the local right 
through to the supranational. At the same time, there has been considerable variance 
in terms of the distinct e-techniques that have been the subject of political 
experimentation. In this sense, Europe's diverse political landscape offers us a rare 
political laboratory for examining the potential impact of varying institutional 
structures and political cultures on distinct forms of so-called e-democratic 
experimentation. This is especially the case with regard to a number of recent e-
voting trials. This paper argues that a focus on small-scale forms of political 
experimentation, such as e-voting, can overcome certain methodological difficulties 
related to undertaking cross-national comparative analyses of larger-scale e-
democratic experimentation. Given the sheer variability in the types of recent e-
democratic experimentation, their focus, target groups, the technologies used and 
the role of distinct public (and private) actors, it is argued that by adopting the former 
approach, that is by focusing on smaller scale trials, we are more likely to ensure that 
comparable phenomena are actually being compared. To the extent that this is 
achieved, and our analyses our more structured and focused across cases, we are 
also more likely to derive valid inferences as to the particular mechanisms or factors 
at play in a given form of ICT enabled political experimentation. 
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Introduction 
In analysing recent experimentation with information and communication 
technologies (ICT) in the political realm, and in particular e-voting, this paper draws 
on insights from three eminent Austrian scholars of the early 20th century. Their 
arguments are quite relevant to contemporary theories about the effects of ICT on 
social and political organisation. On the one hand, it will be argued that the 
arguments of both Friedrich von Hayek and Karl Popper against all forms of utopian 
social engineering offer a penetrating critique that can be readily applied to current 
theorisations regarding abstract constructs such as the information society. On the 
other hand, the work of Josef Schumpeter, and in particular his theories of economic 
development which focus on the innovative role of the entrepreneur, could, with 
appropriate modifications, provide insightful clues as to similar processes of 
innovation in the realm of politics. In brief, this paper uses specific aspects of the 
work of these three scholars as a conceptual point of departure for analysing e-
democratic experimentation.1 It begins by reviewing the arguments of these scholars, 
critiquing contemporary approaches and setting out a framework for the analysis of 
e-democratic experimentation. This sets the scene for three country case studies, 
which form the empirical core of this paper, followed by a comparative review. 
 
1. Piecemeal social engineering 
Beginning in the 1930s and continuing throughout the 1940s and much of the 
subsequent post-war period, both Hayek and Popper were at the intellectual helm of 
what amounted to a blistering critique of the then prevalent social theories. It will be 
argued in this paper that their line of reasoning is equally pertinent to contemporary 
debates about the impact of ICT on practices of democracy. Throughout their 
extensive writings on the philosophy of the social sciences, Hayek and Popper 
relentlessly warned against the dangers of ‘collectivist’ or ‘historicist’ inspired 
theorisations of social change. Their major bone of intellectual contention was, of 
course, targeted at the social theories inspired by Marxism. One theme in particular 
stood out: The dangers and futility of utopian forms of social engineering. The 
essence of Hayek and Popper’s intellectual critique is readily applicable to 
                                                 
1 I will principally draw on the following works: Popper, K. (1957). The poverty of historicism. 
London, UK: Routlege; Hayek, FA (1942), “Scientism and the study of society: Part I”, Economica  
9(35), pp. 2670291; Schumpeter, J. (1911), Theory of Economic Development, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press 
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contemporary e-topias concerning the transformative potential of new technologies. 
In particular, three themes of their work stand out:  
 
First, there is the argument that large-scale prognostications about social change are 
not only futile but tend to be based on intellectual error. Scientifically cloaked 
predictions about large-scale shifts in forms of social organisation must, therefore, be 
treated with extreme caution. Because many of these doctrines draw (mistakenly) on 
the natural sciences for their theoretical inspiration, they tend to focus on the 
misguided search for the driving forces of social transformation such as those that 
are propelled by material or ideational dynamics. 
 
Second, to the extent that experimentation in any social setting is feasible it will need 
to be based on small-scale or, to use Popperian terminology, on ‘piecemeal 
engineering’. It follows, therefore, that our attention should be directed towards the 
empirical analysis of small scale experimentation. Through the trial and error process 
of piecemeal experimentation it is easier to disentangle the purported cause and 
effect mechanisms that are hypothesised to be at play.  However, given the 
complexity of any social setting, as opposed to a controlled laboratory experiment, 
such a task is complicated by the sheer number of possible interactions among an 
almost infinite number of potentially relevant variables. Thus, a corollary of the latter 
is that special attention must also be paid to the unintended consequences of any 
purported political reform or innovation. 
 
Third, rather than offer holistic speculations about the structuring effects of hidden 
technological forces on individuals, the primary focus, on the contrary, must be 
placed on those individuals (or political entrepreneurs) whose deliberate strategies 
are at the core of political experimentation. It is individuals, within their respective 
organisational/political settings, operating according to this or that cognitive script, 
who are engaged in attempts at inducing piecemeal political re-engineering. For 
Schumpeter, innovation and (economic) change was the result of the creativity or 
wild spirits of entrepreneurial individuals.  The same holds true for the realm of 
politics and this suggests that the political strategies of individuals, and their 
institutionally derived motives for pursuing a particular course of action, should be at 
the heart of any explanation.  
 
We can now apply some of these insights to the task at hand: the analysis of ICT 
enabled experimentation in the explicit realm of politics. Much has been written on 
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this topic, especially from a theoretical perspective. To a certain extent, it is probably 
fair to say that the field is characterised by a conspicuous dearth of solid empirical 
material. This is perhaps somewhat surprising since politicking using ICT’s could be 
expected to be likely to generate political conflicts. In fact, the Popperian hypothesis 
that ‘you cannot introduce a political reform without strengthening the opposing 
forces, to a degree roughly in ratio to the scope of the reform’ is especially fitting in 
this context.2 It suggests that even supposedly minor-scale political tinkering is likely 
to generate opposition. If this is the case, then e-democratic experimentation should 
be no different. Indeed, to the extent that it could, at least in theory, affect the degree 
of political contestation over a given issue area, the allocation and distribution of 
(political) resources, or even have a perceived impact electoral outcomes, it is likely 
that e-democratic experimentation will not necessarily be perceived as politically 
neutral. Because of such dynamics, from a practical and, most importantly, from a 
methodological perspective, Popper advocated ‘piecemeal social engineering’. In this 
respect, Popper’s piecemeal social engineer strives to achieve his ends through 
‘adjustments and readjustments which can continually be improved upon’ and will 
make his way ‘step by step, carefully comparing the results achieved, and always on 
the look-out for the unavoidable unwanted consequences of any reform’. This was to 
be distinguished from ‘utopian social engineering’.3 This brings us to a neat paradox: 
while practitioners appear to be engaged in piecemeal political engineering, 
academic theorists have resorted to ever new conceptualisations of the linkage 
between ICT and social change. Indeed, there is no shortage of academic theoretical 
musings on the impact of ICT’s on democratic process that comes perilously close to 
the utopian forms of social engineering that Hayek and Popper castigated. Much of 
this, it could be argued, takes the following simplistic form: the quantitative increase 
in the use of ICT’s in the political realm is producing qualitative shifts in the political 
process. Although hard evidence of such effects may be hard to come by, 
theoreticians can still take misguided comfort in believing themselves to be endowed 
with the foresight of being able to detect the hidden forces at play that, given 
sufficient time, will generate the hypothesised societal change.   
 
Contrary to the large-scale prognostications of the social and political transformation 
theorists, the empirical reality appears to be closer to the Popperian ideal of 
‘piecemeal social engineering’. In other words, in terms of real world e-democratic 
experimentation, much of it is proceeding in small steps, with trials here and there, or 
                                                 
2 See Popper (1957: 57) 
3 See Popper (1957) 
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through the emergence of spontaneous and usually small scale experimentation on 
the part of civil society organisations. Evidence of ‘big bang’ type transformations in 
the political process are far from evident.  This in itself does not refute the 
transformative change theorists since their claims, it could be argued, are predicated 
on the hypothesised cumulative impact of small scale experimentation. This, of 
course, brings us neatly back to the argument about how increasing quantitative 
change in the use of ICT leads to qualitative shifts in social organisation over time.4 
In fact, most theorists conveniently camouflage the logic of their argument with this 
type of conceptual mask. Nonetheless, although the actual causal mechanism is 
perhaps more modestly formulated, the bold claim remains the same. Part of the 
Hayekian and Popperian intellectual critique of this type of social theory was directed 
at unfolding its flawed logic. In a nutshell, it amounts to this: only a super-mind, one 
possessed with a correct model of all the possible interactions between myriad 
individuals, across distinct contextual settings, and with complete information on the 
effects produced by such interactions, could correctly forecast social trajectories. 
Such a human mind, or body of theory, simply does not exist. Because of such 
informational constraints it is, therefore, much better to limit our focus to the more 
modest investigation of Popperian ‘piecemeal social engineering’.  
 
2. The limited universe of forms of e-democratic experimentation 
Having critiqued some of the bold claims of much theorising on the ICT and politics 
nexus, it is now possible to focus more squarely on the subject of analysis.  Over the 
last decade, a great deal of experimentation using ICT’s in the democratic realm has 
been undertaken across Europe. Experimentation has been conducted across 
various levels of political authority, from the local through to the supranational. There 
has also been considerable variance in terms of the distinct e-techniques which have 
been the subject of experimentation. To this end, Europe’s diverse political 
landscape offers us a rare political laboratory for examining the potential impact of 
varying institutional structures and political cultures on forms of e-democratic 
experimentation. However, we quickly run up against our first obstacle, which is 
mostly a definitional one. With little imagination e-democratic experimentation could 
be stretched to encompass a whole host of political phenomena involving, in one way 
or another, the introduction of ICT’s into the political process. Much of this comes 
under the label of ‘e-democracy’. There are numerous problems with the term, most 
                                                 
4 For a further development of this argument see Frank Webster’s influential monograph on Theories of 
the information society (2002). 
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of them related to imprecise definitions.  We ought to therefore pause while trying to 
offer a working definition of what exactly is understood by the term. At a broad level, 
it is probably fair to state that one of the central goals of the many e-democratic 
experimentations involves trying to harness the democratising potential of ICT’s to 
empower the citizen. This suggests a certain process element and brings us neatly to 
our first distinction: e-democracy should be viewed as a process not a product. E-
democracy thus conceived is not an end-state, or a product that can be somehow 
magically purchased if we just implement the right techniques. Instead, e-democracy 
should be seen as a process, one that will involve much experimentation, and many 
trials and errors, across all levels of public authority, but with no specific telos, or 
end-state in mind. This type of understanding is closer to the Popperian ideal 
described above.  We can now offer the first part to our definition: 
 
e-democracy consists of all electronic means of communication that enable/empower citizens 
in their efforts to hold rulers/politicians accountable for their actions in the public realm.  
 
This is a good start, but we are still missing something. Furthermore, it sounds too 
much like a product or an end-state. Therefore, we can try to add some process 
elements to our definition. This can be done by focusing on some of the normative 
goals that underpin the techniques of e-democracy. Thus, a second part of our 
definition can be stated as follows: 
 
Depending on the aspect of democracy being promoted, e-democracy can employ different 
techniques:  (1) for increasing the transparency of the political process; (2) for enhancing the 
direct involvement and participation of citizens and (3) for improving the quality of opinion 
formation by opening new spaces of information and deliberation.  
 
To briefly recapitulate the argument thus far, two dimensions have been 
distinguished: Firstly, e-democracy as a process involving the explicit introduction of 
ICT's into democratic realm and, secondly, the notion that e-democracy techniques 
(or strategies) may be geared towards particular normative goals. While the first 
dimension refers to certain ‘material’ elements mainly related to the evolving nature 
of ICT technology, the second dimension has a notable ‘ideational’ component. 
These two dimensions are brought together in the matrix below (see next page).  
 
Having identified a rather limited universe of e-democratic techniques and forms of 
experimentation we can now endeavour to narrow our e-democratic universe to a 
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single technique: e-voting. Part of the justification for doing so is related to the 
difficulty in selecting examples of e-democratic forms of experimentation that are 
sufficiently similar across countries to allow us to discern or isolate important 
variables. Part of the difficulty arises from the fact that ICT experimentation in the 
democratic realm varies considerably in terms of its focus, target groups, 
technologies used, role of public authorities, etc. This leads to comparative 
methodological difficulties in making sure that comparable phenomena across 
diverse national setting are indeed comparable. To take a relevant example, the 
technique of e-voting has been used as a label to refer to the remote casting of a 
binding vote in a national election as well as to the expression by citizens of a 
political preference on a public policy issue. This is inconsistent given that the two 
are radically different. The latter is perhaps best understood as a form of e-
consultation rather than e-voting. Such difficulties tend to also plague other types of 
e-democratic experimentation, which are less suited to comparative analysis across 
diverse national settings where meanings and the objectives of experimentation can 
fundamentally differ.  
 
 
 
For the present analysis we have striven to select a form of e-democratic 
experimentation that is sufficiently similar across cross-national settings according to 
a number of criteria. The focus is on e-voting as the implementation of a public policy 
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requiring the explicit sanction of state authorities, rather than say, civil society 
organisations or even political parties. The objective of the experimentation is 
straightforward: to offer a given electorate or portion of the electorate the possibility 
to use ICT’s in order to remotely cast a binding vote during an election or 
referendum. Such a definition can aided us when selecting country cases. 
Fortunately, there have been a number of e-voting experimentations in Europe that 
could provide potentially fruitful comparative insights into this particular form of e-
democratic experimentation. It should be stated at the outset that the focus of this 
paper is not that of, say, electoral behaviour studies, which compares turnout rates or 
the socio-demographic profiles of voters, etc.5 Instead, the logic is closer to that of 
comparative public policy research. In certain respects Europe has been relatively 
receptive to forms of e-voting experimentation. This can be contrasted with the 
United States where, on the contrary, e-voting is a divisive issue and where it is 
extremely unlikely, for the foreseeable future at least, that e-voting will become a 
generalised feature of the election process. This of course is a finding in itself. Why, 
for instance, is e-voting such a controversial issue in the United States but, for the 
moment at least, less so in Europe. This should already alert us to the important role 
played by political culture. Unlike the United States therefore, certain European 
states have been more receptive to this form e-politicking. In particular, three 
European states can, arguably, be said to have been at the forefront of e-voting 
experimentation. These are the UK, Switzerland, and Estonia. 
 
3. Towards a framework of analysis 
Before we now turn to examine the experiences in these three states individually and 
then comparatively, we shall briefly outline the conceptualisation informing this paper. 
Having made some progress on first defining e-democratic experimentation and then 
on choosing an e-technique to serve as the basis for case selection, we still need a 
conceptual framework to help structure and focus our empirical investigation. Based 
on the discussion thus far four phases can be identified that structure the way in 
which political experimentation is implemented. These are:  
 
1) Change in the incentive structure: These changes include a ‘materialist’ element 
(that is changes in the availability of new technologies) and an ideational/perceptual 
                                                 
5 This is not in any way to suggest that such approaches are not useful.  On the contrary, scholars 
working within this paradigm have shed light on aspects of e-voting. See for instance Norris (2005), 
and the work of Trechsel (2003, 2004, 2005) 
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component (i.e. in the willingness to experiment with new technologies of 
democracy). Since I have already discussed this in the definition above there is no 
need to rehearse this argument. The main point to underline is that this dimension 
can be treated as a parameter, and one can be agnostic about the ‘material’ 
technology and the changing ‘ideational’ mindset since these are ‘out there’ and can 
be more or less expected to be similar for most cases. In other words, the analysis 
need not focus on explaining changes in the material and/or ideational incentive 
structure. 
 
2) Political actor mobilisation: The change in the incentive structure has offered 
opportunities to a number of political entrepreneurs (both private and public) who 
now deem it in their interest to mobilise in order to offer e-democratic solutions. But, 
as Popper has warned, there is also likely to be a mobilisation of political actors who 
may feel threatened by e-democratic experimentation. The latter can be expected to 
mobilise in order to prevent, or dilute, e-democratic experimentation.   
 
3) Institutional setting: The conflicting demands will need to be settled by a political 
process that is subject to a given set of rules and procedures. These institutional 
arrangements govern the way in which the resolution of political differences occurs 
and the ability of political actors to realize their policy goals. Political actors’ ability to 
create new rules and to experiment (as well as to resist such goals) will be heavily 
mediated by the institutional setting where they interact. 
 
4) Outcomes: These refer to the policy outcomes that emerge in response to the 
demands of policy entrepreneurs and conflicts among political actors. Usually, there 
will be winners and losers in this process. For the purposes of the present analysis 
we are simply concerned with e-voting outcomes. 
 
The main benefit of such a conceptual framework is that it allows us to analytically 
isolate the interaction between stage two, the mobilisation of political actors, and 
stage three, the effects of the institutional setting while remaining largely agnostic 
about stage one. It is this interaction between political actors within their institutional 
setting which, it is argued, is of primary theoretical and empirical interest.  It is here 
where the action is really taking place. Although it is reasonable to expect that there 
may be a similar mobilisation of political actors across the cases, the degree to which 
political actors will be able to realise their goals within their respective institutional 
settings is likely to differ. This alerts us to the important mediating role played by 
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diverse institutional settings in any form of political experimentation. This 
conceptualisation can be graphically represented in figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1: A conceptual model 
 
 
4. The case of e-voting  
A variety of sources, mostly governmental reports and semi-structured interviews 
with governmental officials and national experts, were used for attempting to 
reconstruct the major elements of the policy and political process leading up to the 
introduction of e-voting trials. The analytical narrative presented below highlights in 
summary form some of the main political processes in the three political systems 
analysed. Each case is presented below and is followed by a comparative review of 
the main similarities and differences among the three countries. 
4.1 United Kingdom 
Since the late 1990s and early 2000 the, at the time, newly elected UK Labour 
government undertook a number of prominent efforts to place itself at the cutting 
edge of ICT experimentation in the political realm. In a specific drive to modernise the 
procedures of government, most of the new initiatives, especially those that required 
a considerable financial outlay, were geared towards e-government applications. In 
this sense, the roll out of e-government provided an important backdrop to the more 
specific e-democratic experimentation that is the subject of the present analysis. This 
may also partly explain why the policy rhetoric surrounding e-voting was framed, at 
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least initially, around notions of enhancing the delivery of government services.6 
According to this somewhat questionable analogy (at least from a normative 
democratic perspective), voting was seen as one of the many government-to-citizens 
interactions that could benefit from ICT modernisation.7 Nonetheless, the most 
important legitimating policy discourse for the implementation of e-voting was 
undoubtedly the need to improve participation rates, an issue which had became a 
major government priority. In fact, it was believed that by enhancing the convenience 
of the voting process and bringing it firmly into line with the everyday practices and 
modern lifestyles of citizens, something could be done to potentially halt the 
perceived turnout crisis. Individual politicians advocating the e-voting panacea, such 
as Richard Allen, Nick Raynsford or the House Speaker, the late Robin Cook, 
routinely argued for the modernisation of old-fashioned voting procedures which 
appeared to be more in tune with the 19th century than with the present 21st century. 
They were supported by important institutional players such as the independent 
Electoral Commission. The latter played a crucial role in articulating the case for e-
voting experimentation. In addition, the Electoral Commission would be charged with 
evaluating the pilot projects. 
 
Following a consultation exercise about broader issues of e-democracy initiated by 
the Office for the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), the creation of posts such as that 
of the cabinet level e-Envoy, as well as new legislation for conducting e-voting 
experimentation at the local level, the scene was set for the UK’s first e-voting trials 
scheduled for May 2002. The date is an important one since, in many respects, it 
could be said that the UK was the first country to implement e-voting in the world, at 
least in terms of the definition set out in the previous section.  Essentially, 16 e-voting 
pilots took place in May 2002 and a further 20 experimentations the following year, in 
May 2003. All elections took place at the local level and were legally binding. Not all 
of the trials provided the electorate with the possibility to cast their electronic votes 
remotely however. Initially, the majority of the pilots focused on the back-end 
dimension, such as electronic counting machines, or supervised e-voting, e.g. at 
public kiosks. The key point to underline about the UK pilots is that they were 
focused on multiple channels of voting (e.g. internet, telephone, sms, and digital 
television). 
 
                                                 
6 See for instance the 1999 White Paper on Modernising Government. 
7 Chadwick and May (2003)  
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A number of political actors, including civil servants around the ODPM office, 
commercial players, such as BT, as well as officials in the local authorities that 
signed up for the trials, played an important role in the implementation of the UK’s e-
voting trials. To this list one could also add individual politicians, including those 
seeking election and incumbent candidates. One of the most important points to note 
about the UK trials was that e-voting was inextricably linked to another form of 
remote voting, postal voting. At least two problems have arisen out of this. The first is 
that because e-voting was largely legitimated in terms of its potentially positive 
effects on participation rates, it was also judged on this basis. Unfortunately, the 
evidence in favour of e-voting has been ambiguous at best when evaluated against 
this criterion.  In fact, for Pippa Norris postal voting has been much more effective 
than e-voting for boosting turnout.8 The second problem has been that a number of 
electoral fraud incidents involving postal voting have put the whole electoral 
modernisation exercise under the national media spotlight, with negative effects for 
e-voting. 
 
Despite the fact that in the UK elections can be quite decentralised affairs, central 
government has taken more of a ‘hands-on approach’ in implementing e-voting 
solutions, especially in terms of the relationship with the selected technology 
suppliers. For instance, contracts were made directly between central government 
and technology suppliers. As Pratchett et al9 have noted however, over the longer 
term local authorities can be expected to take on greater responsibilities for 
developing relations with the commercial sector. In addition, the UK’s strategy on e-
voting has been quite unique in terms of the commercial implementation of e-voting. 
Most countries are developing e-voting solutions in which the state ultimately owns 
the final output. In the UK however, it is private sector-led and the technology 
suppliers are likely to own the final system thus ensuring that ownership of the 
system will remain in commercial hands.10 The UK has, in this sense, adopted a pro-
market experimental approach to e-voting by putting in place a series of market 
incentives for commercial suppliers to bear some of the financial risk associated with 
the outlay of e-voting.  
 
Interestingly, in the midst of the preparations for the 2002 e-voting trials the UK 
government went further and formally committed itself to holding an ‘e-enabled 
                                                 
8 See Norris (2005) 
9 See Pratchett et al (2002) 
10 For more details see Pratchett et al (2002)  
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General election’ after 2006. 11 The e-enabled general election is now firmly off the 
agenda especially in view of the politicisation of remote voting (by post and/or 
electronically). Furthermore, despite the government’s commitment no legal basis yet 
exists for conducting national level elections. At the national level the opposition party 
tends to be mostly against the introduction of e-voting while the party in government 
is more enthusiastic. On the ground however, there is considerable variance among 
politicians at the local level which does not necessarily follow partisan lines. The 
basic fear among candidates is that e-voting could favour one party group over 
another. Thus, despite the fact that the UK, to all intents and purposes, could be said 
to have won the sprint to be the first to offer e-voting, it has since been put on the 
‘backburner’. The present lead agency, the Department of Constitutional Affairs, is 
pressing on with small-scale trials in upcoming e-voting elections in May 2007. An e-
enabled general election, even for a small number of constituencies, is unlikely for 
some time. Instead, the focus is on continuing with small scale experimentation at the 
local level with the possibility to offer e-voting for the less politically salient European 
Parliament elections that are scheduled for 2009.12  
 
4.2. Switzerland  
Switzerland is, in many respects, a rather special political system that is 
characterised by two distinctive political institutions. First, an extremely decentralised 
system of federalism that, from comparative perspective, ensures that on many 
measures Switzerland ranks as one of the most decentralised federal polities. 
Second, a special tradition of direct democracy in which citizens are called to vote 
very frequently, in the region of at least 4-5 times a years on federal, cantonal and 
communal issues. The interaction of these two formal institutions, and the specific 
political culture that surrounds their operation, have played an important role in 
shaping the approach to e-voting experimentation, both in terms of its genesis and its 
overall sustainability. With regard to federalism, the division of competencies 
between distinct territorial units (there are three tiers of government) have ensured 
that elections are an extremely decentralised affair. This creates significant 
constraints on the ability of central government to step in and offer e-voting solutions. 
In addition, Switzerland’s tradition of direct democracy and the fact that organising a 
referendum vote, which involves a binary yes/no vote, is easier to implement than an 
                                                 
11 See the 2002 strategic paper by the e-Envoy, In the service of democracy: A consultation paper on a 
policy for electronic democracy. London: Office of the e-Envoy.  
12 Interview with local authority election official. 
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e-election, which in the Swiss case is a complex affair, ensured that referendums 
votes would be the natural candidate for initial ICT experimentation. 
 
In the year 2000 a number of politicians in the Swiss Parliament presented formal 
motions in which the issue of e-voting was raised.13 Caught up in the e-euphoria of 
the times, these Swiss parliamentarians were concerned about Switzerland’s 
progress on matters related e-government and, more specifically, the roll out of e-
voting. With these formal parliamentary requests deposited, the legal and political 
basis now existed for the Federal government’s administration to initiate a study on 
the feasibility of e-voting. 14  The e-voting project was led by the Federal 
Chancellery’s Political Rights Division, a unit which operates in a similar fashion to 
that of many national Electoral Commissions but without the independent status that 
is sometimes accorded to such organisations. It is important to note that the 
organisation of elections is a cantonal (and in some cases a communal) competence, 
the central government only establishes certain basic procedural guidelines for 
federal elections. Under such conditions, the role played by federal agencies would, 
at best, be limited to facilitating e-voting experimentation rather than implementing it. 
This is indeed what happened when, in response to a questionnaire sent out by the 
Federal agency, three Cantons took up the e-voting challenge and initiated 
preparations for conducting trials. The federal level provided financing of up to 80 per 
cent of the additional cost of organising e-voting trials for national referendums in the 
three pioneer cantons. As long as the cantons respected certain basic voting 
principles they were largely free to implement their preferred e-voting solutions. The 
cantons were also free to establish relations with technology suppliers and organise 
their own commercial contracts.  In effect, this means that Switzerland has developed 
three distinct e-voting systems, the Geneva, Zurich and Neuchatel models. The only 
                                                 
13 In particular the following parliamentary motion by politicians should be singled out: 
a) mozione del Gruppo radicale-democratico (00.3298) del 19 giugno 2000: «E-Switzerland. 
Modifiche legislative, scadenzario e mezzi», trasmessa come postulato dal 
Consiglio nazionale il 6 ottobre 2000 (Boll. Uff. 2000 N 1196); b) postulato Helen Leumann-Würsch 
(00.3347) del 22 giugno 2000: «E-Switzerland. Modifiche legislative, scadenzario e mezzi», trasmesso 
dal Consiglio degli Stati il 18 settembre 2000 (Boll. Uff. 2000 S 485 seg.); c) interpellanza Briner 
(00.3242) del 5 giugno 2000: «E-Government. Strategia del Consiglio federale», risposta del 18 
settembre 2000 (Boll. Uff. 2000 S 485 seg.); d) postulato Maya Lalive d’Epinay (00.3271) del 13 
giugno 2000: «Sensibilizzazione sull’importanza delle tecnologie dell’informazione e della 
comunicazione», trasmessa il 6 ottobre 2000 (Boll. Uff. 2000 N 1193); e) interpellanza Maillard 
(00.3402) del 23 giugno 2000: «Società dell’informazione. Da slogan a vera e propria politica», non 
ancora discussa dal Consiglio nazionale. 
14 See the Rapporto sul voto elettronico: le opportunità, i rischi e la fattibilità dell’esercizio dei diritti 
politici per via elettronica del 9 gennaio 2002, avaialable at 
http://www.bk.admin.ch/themen/pore/evoting/00776/02029/index.html?lang=it&unterseite=yes 
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proviso stipulated by the federal government was that ownership of the e-voting 
solutions would remain the property of the cantons. Furthermore, the pioneer cantons 
were obliged to share their technology or make it accessible to other cantons wishing 
to experiment with e-voting.  
 
Three years after the parliamentary initiatives were adopted the first e-voting trials 
took place in a small commune in the Canton of Geneva in 2003. Since then, 
numerous e-voting trials have been conducted in the three cantons for national (as 
well as cantonal and communal) referendums providing a veritable learning 
experience in the domain of e-voting. More recently, in the canton of Zurich some 
communes have now started to experiment with e-voting for elections.15 At this point 
it would appear that the roll out of e-voting, having been the subject of numerous and 
successful trials between 2003 and 2006, was on a secure path to becoming 
generalised, at least in those pioneer cantons. But this is not the case and, 
furthermore, neither was such a smooth trajectory envisaged for e-voting. For a start, 
federal financing has now been terminated given that the initial budget was limited to 
5 years. Nonetheless, the cantons wanting to implement e-voting are still free to use 
the systems developed by the three pioneer cantons.  Thus, the real problem is more 
political than financial. E-voting has not been universally welcomed and there are 
powerful political forces that are against e-voting. The arguments range from the 
risks involved in conducting e-voting trials, the cost implications, to arguments related 
to digital divide issues and claims that it devalues the symbolic act of voting. 
Interestingly, the last argument also applies to postal voting, an accepted and 
presently by far the most heavily used voting channel. In fact, the postal voting 
analogy is particularly apt for the Swiss case. It took around thirty years for the postal 
vote to become generalised, and even now it is still subject to considerable variation 
depending on the canton or commune. The federal council is, in this sense, pursuing 
a similar ‘open approach’ with e-voting as it did with postal voting. For many years, 
postal voting was available in only 50 per cent of the cantons and not in the others. 
Only after a critical mass of pressure built up did the confederation step in and ask 
the cantons to offer postal voting for federal votes (although not at the cantonal 
level). This happened in 1994 and from then on it was mandatory for federal 
elections. This suggests a useful parallel for the present e-voting trials and their 
future trajectory.  
 
                                                 
15 This was the case in the commune of Bulach during elections in March and October of 2006. 
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The cantons are of course free to implement e-voting for cantonal and/or communal 
elections. Given the frequency of votes, however, the cantons in practice tend to 
‘bundle’ federal and cantonal votations thus making it impractical to have a separate 
voting systems for each election. The operation of federalism has, in this way, 
structured the step by step implementation of e-voting in Switzerland. In fact, the 
gradual implementation of e-voting is the policy preference of those in favour of e-
voting since a ‘big bang’ introduction of e-voting is simply out of the question in the 
Swiss political context. The main problem is that some politicians, especially those 
from the Swiss People’s party, perceive themselves to be the most likely losers if e-
voting is generalised. In the typical Swiss consensus political style, a negotiated 
compromise has been reached in 2006 whereby a 10 per cent limit has been set for 
e-voting.16 This means that no more than 10 per cent of the electorate can be offered 
e-voting. In this sense, the federal council is the key bargaining forum and to change 
the 10 per cent compromise some considerable pressure would have to be put on 
the federal council which could only probably come form the cantons. For the 
moment it seems that most political players are content with the 10 per cent 
threshold and we can expect a lengthy introduction of e-voting that will be subject to 
considerable variation among the cantons. 
 
4.3 Estonia 
Unlike the older democracies of the UK and Switzerland, Estonia, a former 
communist state, has only very recently democratised.  Although it maybe a so-called 
neo-democracy, its political elite have taken very concrete steps to position this small 
Baltic republic at the vanguard of e-democratic experimentation on a truly global 
scale. The political eagerness to experiment with ICT’s should be considered as part 
of a broader ‘branding’ exercise to put this small Baltic state on the international 
political map.  This is an important factor in explaining the haste with which the 
Estonian political elite took up the global challenge to try to be the first to offer e-
voting. One of the most important preconditions for Estonia’s e-voting 
experimentation has been the online availability of government e-services. A wide 
range of government services that involve interactions with citizens have been put 
online since the government took steps in 1998 to implement a sophisticated e-
government infrastructure. The crucial technological component to this architecture is 
an electronic national identity card or smartcard, which functions much like a banking 
                                                 
16 There is actually a 20 per cent limit for referendums in which the ‘double majority’ applies 
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card, and allows citizens to conduct transactions with government. First initiated in 
1998, the smartcard project has been generalised to the Estonian population and is 
now compulsory for every citizen. With this so-called public key infrastructure firmly in 
place, many of the problematic authentication and verification issues that afflict the 
roll out of e-voting could be potentially resolved. Offering e-voting to the electorate 
was therefore seen as a logical next step for a government that already had 
considerable experience in online transactions with its citizens.  
 
With the benefit of hindsight, it was not altogether too surprising when the plan to 
introduce e-voting in Estonia was first publicly announced by the Minister of Justice, 
Märt Rask, a member of the Reform Party in early 2001. It was also strongly 
supported by the then Prime Minister. At the time it looked as if Estonia would be the 
first nation to offer e-voting to its electorate with local elections scheduled for 2002 
and national elections the following year. Unfortunately, for the early enthusiasts the 
implementation of e-voting, even when justified in terms of Estonia’s re-branding or 
reversing the decline in turnout, turned out to be no straightforward affair. In fact, the 
e-voting agenda became the object of intense politicisation and even triggered a 
constitutional court conflict over the legality of e-voting.17 
 
The major problem with the roll out of e-voting was the perception that it would 
benefit certain politicians or political parties disproportionately. The problems 
emerged during the legislative phase of updating Estonian electoral law to make it e-
voting compatible.18 Estonia has a multi-party system and e-voting was opposed by a 
number of political parties, with the more progressive parties (in the liberal sense) 
generally in favour and conservative parties against. Because of this antagonism the 
e-voting timetable had to be modified.19 The compromise reached was that there 
would be no e-voting for the 2002 local elections, or the 2003 national elections. In 
fact, the earliest date for e-voting would be 2005. With this compromise in place new 
legislation was passed that allowed e-voting to be used for local elections, national 
elections, European Parliament elections and referendums. But this was not the end 
of the political controversies. After having created the legal basis in 2002, the 
National Electoral Commission took the lead in implementing e-voting as foreseen by 
                                                 
17 Drechsler, W (2003) The Estonian E-Voting Laws Discourse: Paradigmatic Benchmarking for 
Central and Eastern Europe 
18 For a detailed review see Drechsler, W (2003) The Estonian E-Voting Laws Discourse:. 
Paradigmatic Benchmarking. for Central and Eastern Europe. Available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/nispacee/unpan009212.pdf 
19 These controversies are discussed at length by Drechsler (2003) 
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the new law. Shortly after, a constitutional conflict around the issue of e-voting broke 
out between the President, Arnold Ruutel, representing the Rural party, and the 
Estonian Parliament. The issue related to the accusation that e-voting violated the 
principle of the secrecy of the vote, a common argument used by opponents of e-
voting. The conflict was not settled until September 2005, exactly one month before 
Estonia’s first scheduled -vote for local elections. The Estonian Supreme Court ruled 
that the proposed e-voting system did not violate the secrecy principle. With this 
Court decision in place, and despite the opposition from President and a number of 
political parties, the Estonian government has pushed ahead with its e-voting 
agenda.  
 
After a successful e-voting pilot trial for a local Referendum earlier in the year, the 
Estonian electorate was finally able to cast an electronic ballot for the local elections 
in October 2005. Paradoxically, the fact that the proportion of those who used the 
new voting channel amounted to slightly under 2% of the total electorate probably did 
much to allay fears that e-voting would disproportionately favour the liberal parties. In 
effect, this neutralised some of the antagonism towards e-voting and meant that the 
Estonian government could press ahead with its e-voting agenda with relatively little 
political resistance from opponents. Since then the e-vote advocacy coalition has 
grown in rapidly in strength and made up for earlier postponements and lost time. 
The culmination of these efforts was realised in March 2007 when the Estonian 
government held the first election in which e-voting could be used for a ‘national’ 
election by all the electorate.20 In these most recent elections the proportion of those 
casting an electronic vote increased moderately from nearly 2 per cent of the 
electorate to 3 per cent.21  
 
Until the recent Estonian elections of 2007, all e-voting trials had been at the local or 
regional level. Although they had missed out on the global race to implement a 
legally binding e-voting system for local elections, an honour that was awarded to the 
UK, the Estonian political elite have achieved the political goal of being the first to 
offer a generalised e-voting system to an entire electorate, not just at the local level 
but also for the more politically salient national elections. Unless, beaten to it by other 
member states of the European Union, a rather tall order at this stage, the Estonians 
                                                 
20 Of course, it was necessary that one should be in possession of the electronic ID card. 
21 See the official results available in at http://www.vvk.ee/r07/paeveng.stm#. 
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look like being the first to offer a national electorate e-voting for the European 
Parliamentary elections as well. 
 
5. Comparative insights  
In reviewing the three country experiences important points of similarity and 
difference can be noted among the cases. These have been summarised in the five 
tables below. The focus is on 1) certain macro-political variable, 2) electoral 
variables, 3) e-voting preconditions, 4) the nature of the e-voting trials and 5) e-voting 
outocomes. 
 
Table 1 Macro political variables 
  
Size (European 
standards) 
 
Type of 
democracy 
 
Territorial 
structure of polity 
 
 
UK 
 
 
Large 
 
Archeo 
Democracy 
 
Regional-
decentralised 
 
 
Switzerland 
 
 
 
Small 
 
Archeo 
Democracy 
 
Federalised-
decentralised 
 
Estonia 
 
 
Small 
 
Neo 
democracy 
 
 
Unitary 
 
 
Table 2 Electoral variables 
  
Electoral system 
 
Tradition of 
remote voting 
 
Frequency of 
voting 
 
 
UK 
 
 
Majoritarian 
 
NO 
 
Low 
 
Switzerland 
 
 
 
Proportional 
 
YES 
 
High 
 
Estonia 
 
 
Proportional 
 
NO 
 
Low 
 
 20
 
 
 
Table 3 E-voting (preconditions) 
 
  
Need for new 
legislation 
 
Legal conflicts
 
IT security 
context 
 
 
Level of e-
government 
 
UK 
 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Problematic 
 
High 
 
Switzerland 
 
 
 
Yes (with veto 
point for 
federal level) 
 
No 
 
Mixed, 
Favourable 
 
Mixed/Low 
 
Estonia 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Very 
Favourable 
 
High 
 
 
Table 4 E-vote (trials) 
 
 
 
  
Type of e-voting 
trials 
 
 
Approach to the 
roll out of e-voting
 
Role of private 
sector 
 
 
UK 
 
 
e-election 
 
Limited trials 
 
Pro-market 
 
Switzerland 
 
 
 
Mixed, but mostly 
e-referendum 
 
Limited trials (10% 
threshold) 
 
State owned  
 
Estonia 
 
 
e-election 
 
‘Big bang’ 
approach 
 
State owned 
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Table 5 E-vote (outcomes) 
 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
In reviewing our case study’s central findings on e-voting policy trajectories we have 
noted that despite notable structural dissimilarities among the cases, the strategies of 
political actors have been quite similar in the three polities under investigation, 
especially in terms of the mobilisation of policy entrepreneurs in favour of e-voting. 
Their actions were framed in terms of similar rhetorical devices and legitimating 
discourses that were similarly deployed across the three cases. Part of the subtext 
behind the policy discourse was that many of the political actors pushing for e-voting 
were involved in an undeclared race to be the first to implement e-voting and thus be 
seen to be at the vanguard of ICT enabled political innovation. These individuals 
were certainly not in the dark about progress on e-voting within their political 
counterparts’ national settings and would meet in international forums such as those 
organised around the topic of e-voting by international organisations like the Council 
of Europe. The potential interaction effects produced in such settings have been 
beyond the scope of this paper but can be considered to not be negligible. 
Nevertheless, this does not detract from the central insights derived from analysing 
the country cases. Political mobilisation in favour of e-voting was not only similarly 
forthcoming in the three cases but also generated similar degrees of antagonism on 
the part of e-voting sceptics. The Popperian hypothesis discussed in the introductory 
sections was thus confirmed. What certainly differed however, was the role of 
intermediary political institutions. These have helped to produce some notable 
 
Political context for 
further e-voting 
trials 
 
 
Technology 
platforms 
 
Links to other 
forms of e-
democracy 
 
 
UK 
 
 
Unfavourable/Mixed
 
Competing models 
 
Initially Yes 
 
Switzerland 
 
 
 
Mixed 
 
Competing models 
 
No 
 
Estonia 
 
 
Favourable 
 
Single model 
 
Yes 
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differences in the e-voting trajectories across the three systems. It appears that 
certain political institutions and constellations of political actors can provide a more 
favourable political climate for e-voting experimentation. This suggests, much as any 
political scientist would expect, that it is political actors and specific political 
institutions that explain variance in outcomes rather than more abstract and wishful 
thinking about the role of technology drivers. Nonetheless, it is important to state that 
in the Estonian case at least, an important pre-condition was the existence of 
relatively secure e-government infrastructure. As regards the legitimating discourse 
about increasing participation, presently, given the lack of e-voting experimentation 
over time, we have to be rather careful about prognostications concerning purported 
effects on turnout. We are at an early stage and it is too difficult to disentangle the 
‘novelty effect’ of e-voting to say anything about purported positive effects on turnout.  
On the other hand, what has been established is that e-voting is not perceived as a 
politically neutral innovation and to the extent that this is the case, it is likely to 
continue to generate political controversy among political actors with conflicting 
passions and interests. 
